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Event: Major General Ronald Burgess Jr.

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Participants – non-Commission: Major General Ronald Burgess Jr., Lieutenant Colonel Susan Gibson (Defense Intelligence Agency)

Participants – Commission: Gordon Lederman, Bonnie Jenkins

(U) BACKGROUND.

(U) A copy of MG Burgess's biography is attached. He began his Army in armor as an intelligence officer, focusing on tactical issues. From 1995 to 1997, he was commander of the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade in Panama. From 1997 to 1999, he was Director of Intelligence (J-2) of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). From 1999 to 2003, he was J-2 for the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). In May 2003, he became J-2 for the Joint Staff. As J-2, he serves as the primary intelligence adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also is responsible in the Department of Defense (DoD) for indications and warning (I&W).

(U) COMBATANT COMMANDERS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC)

(S) USSOUTHCOM was most vociferous regarding its "angst" for not receiving support from the IC. USSOUTHCOM understood that it was neither the U.S. Pacific Command nor the U.S. Central Command, which had a high priority for intelligence – no one in Central and South America threatened the United States. [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

USSOUTHCOM received good IC support against drugs, but the IC was less responsive concerning Colombia. USSOUTHCOM had good relations with CIA, [redacted] MG Burgess spoke regularly with the head of CIA's Latin American Division. However, the Latin American Division lost [redacted] capability after 9/11 as resources were transferred to the war on terrorism. He noted that here is a formal system by which Combatant Commanders turn in intelligence requirements twice per year.

(U) MANAGEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

(U) DoD's move toward precision weaponry results in DoD having requirements for increased fidelity of information. Moreover, the world situation is such that the U.S. Government needs to know "a little bit about everything." However, there has not been a corresponding increase in the IC's force structure.

(U) The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) views the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) as "DoD assets." The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), of course, is the President's intelligence adviser. The real problem arises in terms of sharing resources. Some information collected by NIMA and NSA is not given to DoD. Indeed, as J-2 of USSOUTHCOM, he would wrestle with NIMA and NSA to get more information. Sometimes he would rely on having the USSOUTHCOM 4-star Combatant Commander call NSA to get information.

(U) He does not believe that the DCI should receive execution authority. Having the CIA Director also be the DCI is like having "the fox guarding the henhouse."

(U) Creation of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD/I) creates "a new set of dynamics." USD/I Cambone does not get involved in operations but rather focuses on resources, strategy and policy. Cambone also does not get involved in budgetary matters for the NFIP, which are the DCI's responsibility.

(U) The IC rarely ignores Assistant DCI (ADCI) for Collection Charlie Allen when he gives collection guidance. The ADCI/Collection and ADCI/Analysis & Production generally deal with crises. They will push back if there is a priority that is conflicting with counterterrorism needs.

(U) COUNTERTERRORISM

(U) There is no strategy document concerning intelligence support for counterterrorism across the IC or on an interagency basis. There is a Joint Intelligence Coordination Group for DoD, but he was unaware of one on the national level. He asked who is writing the national-level campaign strategy for counterterrorism - it is not coming from the DCI.

~~(S)~~ Today, counterterrorism for DoD is more than force protection. Indeed, the war on terrorism has brought a change in paradigms. For example, the term "actionable intelligence" has different definitions for an F-15 pilot - who needs more granular information - and a special forces team, which would need less information due to their high-level of training. (See attached summary by Bonnie Jenkins concerning MG Burgess's statements)

(U) Information-sharing within the IC has improved, but there are continuing problems regarding sharing of law enforcement information for the following reasons: (1) not everyone understands what they can and cannot share; (2) the FBI is oriented toward

building cases, while DoD wants to warn of attacks; and (3) there are technical problems with database interactions across agency lines.

(U) WARNING

(U) He declared that it was only "when," not "if," the United States would have another domestic attack. Information that forms the basis of warning is always ambiguous. Prior to 9/11, there may have been a hesitation among officials responsible for warning to issue frequent warnings based on vague information, for fear of being accused of "crying wolf." In contrast, today officials responsible for warning give the information to the policymakers to let the policymakers decide to take action or wait for specifics. MG Burgess questioned with the current orientation is noble or represents "CYA." He noted that if there is an attack and a warning official had information, then the government stands-up a commission to investigate or otherwise will "let loose the piranhas." As for policymakers' responsibility, he noted that policymakers should never set a "cut-line" on warning [BONNIE, DO YOU HAVE MORE INFORMATION ON WHAT HE SAID IN THIS REGARD?]. Redundancy is useful in terms of analysis for warning. Competitive analysis is needed to preclude groupthink. However, there needs to be one person who is ultimately responsible for making "the final call." He said that the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the Dept. of Homeland Security currently have the responsibility for warning domestically. It is less clear who has responsibility for warning abroad, as State has that responsibility for embassies, while DoD has that responsibility for DoD sites – and there are, of course, many non-State and non-DoD sites with Americans located abroad that could be targets of attack.

(U) He discussed the threat of manportable anti-aircraft missiles ("manpads") as an example of the difficulties of warning. If 2 people wanted to attack a domestic flight yet never used a telephone to discuss the attack, had no deadline by which to attack, and were patient, then these individuals would basically be impossible to stop. What is the tradeoff between lives and money, he asked – in other words, how much is a life worth? On the one hand, equipping all domestic jetliners with anti-manpad devices would cost billions in order to save a few hundred people; on the other hand, the economic consequences of a single manpad use would be billions upon billions of dollars. Moreover, there is a question as to whether a manpad could actually down a jetliner; on the other hand, manpads are so easy to build, equipping jetliners with sophisticated anti-manpad devices might not defend against simple rocket-propelled grenades that are modified with electronics bought at Radio Shack.